Nagel's Bat, Jackson's Knowledge Argument, and Chalmers' Hard Problem which question whether consciousness is physical or not, are the cornerstones of consciousness problem, one of the most argued topics of analytic philosophy since 70s and 80s. In the question of whether consciousness is a physical phenomena or not, eliminative materialism, proposed by Paul and Patricia Churchland, argues that since we use a term like "conscious" from folk psychology, we think that "consciousness" has a distinct ontology, however we should use a term that comes from neuroscience, and thus sees consciousness as a physical entity. On the grounds of this reasoning, eliminative materialism proposes how modern neuroscience can shed light on phenomenal experience. In this talk by Yunus Şahin, the consciousness argument is covered from eliminative materialism's point of view. We thank Öncül Analitik Felsefe Dergisi, Yunus Şahin, and all of the attendants.